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NOTE
ADJUSTING THE ADJUSTMENT BOARD: JURISDICTIONAL
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 3 OF
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
When in 1934 Congress was deliberating upon amendments to the
Railway Labor Act,' even the most resolute proponent of a National Railroad Adjustment Board conceded that to create such a board would be
"an experiment." 2 The experiment was tried, but Congress did not pause
to assess its results for more than thirty years; when it finally did so, it
concluded almost unanimously' that parts of the experiment had "failed." 4
Consequently, in the summer of 1966 there was enacted Public Law 89456,' which makes two significant changes in the Railway Labor Act.
First, it provides for the settlement of grievances at the local level when
either party so desires; the purpose of this provision is to lessen the
NRAB's burdensome backlog. Second, it prohibits judicial review of the
merits of decisions of the NRAB or of local grievance machinery. The
necessity, the probable effectiveness, and the constitutionality of this new
legislation are the subject of this note.
I.

BACKGROUND:

THE ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM

Labor disputes on the railroads are of two types. The first type,
called a "major dispute,"' arises from the difficulties of a carrier and
union in negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. The second
type, called a "minor dispute,"' is a controversy over the interpretation,
1. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
2. Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) (remarks of Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of
Transportation).
3. The House voted 380-0 to enact the amendment; 112 CONG. REc. 2642 (daily ed.
Feb. 9, 1966). The Senate passed it by voice vote; 112 CONG. REc. 11849 (daily ed. June

7, 1966).
4. S. R P. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
5. Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 20, 1966), U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1525.

6. Major disputes are handled by the National Mediation Board and through other
procedures provided in the act. See Railway Labor Act § 5, as amended, 48 Stat. 1196
(1934), 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
7. "Minor disputes" is a shorthand term used in the industry for the statutory
phrase "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Railway Labor Act

§ 3 First (i), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1964). For
a judicial discussion of the difference between major and minor disputes see Hilbert v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1961).
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construction, or application of an existing agreement. The latter is the
type with which this note is concerned. Even before the enactment of
the new legislation, a variety of methods was available for the resolution
of minor disputes.
The National Railroad Adjustment Board
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary between the parties,
the proper forum for the adjustment of minor disputes on the railroads8
is the appropriate division (according to the type of employee involved 9 )
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board in Chicago. The NRAB is
a bipartisan tribunal; each of its four divisions is composed of representatives of the national unions and of railroad management in equal number, and each member of the Board receives his salary from the interests
he represents, rather than from the government.'"
NRAB procedures are relatively simple. When a dispute arises
that the parties cannot settle by the processes provided in the collective
bargaining agreement, either the carrier or the employee may submit the
dispute to the Board."
(In practice, the carriers seldom submit disputes, 2 and most disputes submitted by employees are submitted by the
union in the employee's behalf.")
If after considering the case the
Board is unable to reach a decision because of disagreement between its
management and union factions, a neutral person, called a "referee," is
appointed either by the Board or, if the Board is unable to agree upon a
neutral person, by the National Mediation Board in Washington, D.C.'
When a decision is finally reached it is called an "award"; an award in
8. Railway Labor Act § 205, added by 49 Stat. 1190 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 185
(1964), provides for the establishment of a National Air Transport Adjustment Board
"when, in the judgment of the National Mediation Board, it shall be necessary." The
NMB has not yet exercised its power to establish such a board. See 31 NMB ANN. REP.
46 (1965).
9. The four categories of employees are enumerated in Railway Labor Act § 3
First (h), as amended, 48 Stat. 1190 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (h) (1964).
10. For the method of selecting members of the NRAB see Railway Labor Act §3
3 First (a)-(h), as amended, 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 3 First (a)-(h) (1964).
11. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (i), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First (i) (1964).
12. But see Cook v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 263 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 866 (1959) ; Sjaastad v. Great No. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 760 (D.N.D. 1958).
13. In Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 710 (1945), modified on rehearing, 327
U.S. 661 (1946), the Supreme Court held that an adverse NRAB decision was not binding upon an employee who had not sufficiently authorized his union to prosecute his
claim before the NRAB. In regard to the problem where the union is opposed to the
claim of an employee or where the employee is not a member of the union, see Lazar,
"Individual" and "Outside Union" Grievances Before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board First Division, 15 LAB. L.J. 231 (1964) ; Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, 296
F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
14. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (1), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First (1) (1964).
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favor of the employee results in an "order" directing the carrier to comply with the award, and an award in favor of the carrier results in an
"order" to the employee stating that his claim has been denied.15
If a carrier refuses to comply with an award and order of the Board,
the employee may sue for enforcement in a United States district court.
If he is unsuccessful, costs are paid by the United States; if he prevails,
the judgment in his favor includes an allowance for attorney's fees.1"
There is no procedure by which a carrier may enforce an award in its
favor."
A much-controverted point is whether the creation of the NRAB
by Congress has deprived the employee of the right to bring common-law
actions in the state and federal courts based on breach of the employment
contract."' In 1941 the Supreme Court held in Moore v. Illinois Central
15. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (o), as amended, 48 Stat. 1192 (1934), as amended,
Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 1526 (language added by Pub. L. No. 456 is italicized) :
In case of an award by any division of the Adjustment Board in favor of
petitioner, the division of the Board shall make an order, directed to the carrier,
to make the award effective and, if the award includes a requirement for the
payment of money, to pay the employee the sum to which he is entitled under
the award on or before a day named. In the event any division determines that
an award favorable to the petitioner should not be made in any dispute referred
to it, the division shall make an order to the petitioner stating such determination.
There does not appear to be any practical difference between an award and an order.
The sole case involving an attempt to enforce an award without the accompanying order,
Smith v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 32 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D. La. 1940), was dismissed on other
grounds. The courts have extended the requirement of a time limit to non-money as
well as money awards. Railroad Yardmasters v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 166 F.2d
326 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Knudsen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 106 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
Note that before the 1966 amendment "orders" were directed only to the carrier. This
was consistent with the idea that the carrier could easily obtain compliance with an
award in its favor. See note 17 infra. The new language apparently is designed to harmonize with the new versions of subsections (p) (note 118 infra) and (q) (note 117
iafra), which provide for enforcement, review, etc., in terms of both "awards" and
"orders."
16. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), as amended, 48 Stat. 1192 (1934), as amended,
Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(c)-(d) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1526.
17. "Provision for judicial enforcement of awards against employees was thought
to be unnecessary since grievances are usually asserted by employees challenging some
action by the carrier, and if the grievance is not sustained by the Board, the award merely
dismisses the claim and requires no affirmative action by the employee." Union Pac.
R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 611 n.10 (1959). "It was felt . . . that the carrier had
the power in its hands to enforce the awards of the Board as against the individual."
Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Colnmerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1934). It should be noted, however, that when a union
calls a strike over an issue already decided adversely to it by the NRAB, the courts will
enjoin the strike. See note 88 infra and accompanying text. The injunction in such a
case might be viewed as "enforcement" of the Board's award.
18. See generally Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 41, 57-59 (1962) ; Rose, The Railway Labor Act and
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R.R.19 that a discharged employee could bring a diversity action for damages in a federal court without first seeking a determination of the
merits of the claim from the NRAB. The language of Moore was interpreted by many courts to mean that the courts and the NRAB had
concurrent jurisdiction of all minor disputes. 2' But in 1950 the Supreme
Court in Slocur v. Delaware, Lackawannz & W.R.R.2 1 limited Moore to
its facts. The rule of the Slocum case is that the state and federal courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction only over common-law wrongful discharge cases where the employee seeks damages rather than reinstatement
or other relief ;22 in all other cases the NRAB has "exclusive jurisdiction."2 In a later case 24 the Court, emphasizing that wrongful discharge
is not a federal claim under the Railway Labor Act, held that even a discharged employee must first seek relief from the NRAB if state law requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing suit.
With certain exceptions,25 the rule distinguishing wrongful discharge
the Jurisdictionof the Courts, 8 LAB. L.J. 9 (1957) ; Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes
and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 18 U. Cni. L. REv. 303 (1951).
19. 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
20. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., 121 F.2d 808, 810 (7th Cir.
1941), in which the court, on the authority of Moore, reversed the dismissal of an action
brought by employees seeking a declaratory judgment of their seniority rights, saying
"[W]e can definitely state that the employees' action may be brought, at their election,
either in a court, or settled by the administrative remedies provided by said Act." Even
before Moore, it had been assumed that Congress in creating the NRAB did not intend
"to limit the previously existing jurisdiction of the court, but rather to extend that jurisdiction to cases to which it had not been previously applied." Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d
481, 484 (7th Cir. 1936) (dictum).
21. 339 U.S. 239 (1950). See also Order of Ry. Conductors v. Southern Ry., 339
U.S. 255 (1950) ; Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
22. Part of the reasoning advanced in support of the Slocum holding was that decision of all cases by the NRAB would result in uniformity. Accordingly, the Court distinguished the situation of a discharged employee because "such a case does not involve
questions of future relations between the railroad and its other employees. If a court
in handling such a case must consider some provision in a collective bargaining agreement, its interpretation would have of course no binding effect on future interpretations
by the Board." Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., supra note 21, at 244.
23. Ibid.
24. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
25. One of the exceptions has arisen where the dispute involves racial or other
hostile discrimination. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Rumbaugh v.
Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1964) (extensive discussion); Thompson v.
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Britton v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 303 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d
648 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1949). In general,
the NRAB has no jurisdiction to hear disputes -between employee and union, as opposed
to disputes between employee and carrier. Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., supra. Also,
the employee may by-pass the Board when his claim involves questions of law outside
the collective bargaining agreement, such as the statutory rights of a returning serviceman. Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S. 225 (1966) (by implication); McKinney
v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. 357 U.S. 265 (1958); see also Manning v. American Airlines, 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1964).
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from other cases has remained for some time.2" Recently, however, the
Court in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddoa. refused to apply Moore to allow a discharged employee to bring a state action to enforce rights under
other labor legislation.28 The language of Maddox indicates that the demise of Moore, and the consequent denial of primary access to the courts
in all minor railway labor disputes, is at hand."
Supplenental Boards
Each division of the NRAB has the power to establish one or more
subordinate boards to hear disputes within the division's jurisdiction."
The statute defines such boards as "regional adjustment boards," but
they are usually called "supplemental boards" and their jurisdiction is
not defined in regional terms; for example, a board created by the First
Division currently has jurisdiction of firemen's cases only."' Such a
board has "the same authority to conduct hearings, make findings upon
disputes, and adopt the same procedure as the division of the Adjustment
'2
Board establishing it." 3

26. See Barker v. Southern Pac. Co., 314 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1961); Hilbert v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1961); McNamar v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 254
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Walters v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 216 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1954) ;
Buster v. Chicago M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 195 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Broady v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 191 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1951); Brooks v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 177
F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1949); Burke v. Union Pac. R.R., 129 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1942);
Hudie v. Aliquippa & So. R.R., 249 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ; Kendall v. Pennsylvania R.R., 94 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695
(E.D. Mo. 1947) ; Swartz v. South Buffalo Ry., 44 F. Supp. 447 (W.D.N.Y. 1942). See
also Roberts v. Western Pac. R.R., 104 Cal. App. 2d 816, 232 P.2d 560 (1951) ; Query
v. Boston & Me. R.R., 348 Mass. 294, 203 N.E.2d 545 (1965) ; Wilson v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 362 Mo. 1168, 247 S.W.2d 644 (1952).
27. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
28. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
29. According to the dissent of Mr. Justice Black, "the Court recognizes the relevance of Moore and [Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953)]
and, while declining expressly to overrule them in this case, has raised the overruling axe
so high that its falling is just about as certain as the changing of the seasons." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 667 (1965). Even the majority conceded that
"a major underpinning for the continued validity of the Moore case in the field of the
Railway Labor Act . . .has been removed." Id. at 655. See also id. at 657 n.14. This
was authority enough for the Fourth Circuit, which recently refused to follow Moore in
a Railway Labor Act case, saying that although the Supreme Court in Maddox did not
overrule Moore, "the ratio decidendi embraces the instant controversy." Walker v.
Southern Ry., 354 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 926 (1966).
30. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (x), as amended, 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), as renumbered, Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. § 2(e) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1527 [formerly codified as 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w) (1964)].
31.

See 31 NMB ANN. REP. 49 (1965).

32. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (x), as amended, 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), as renumbered, Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. § 2(e) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEws 1527 [formerly codified as 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (w) (1964)].
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System, Group, Regional, and Special Adjustment Boards
If a carrier and union wish to avoid the jurisdiction of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, they may do so by agreeing to the establishment of what is usually called a "special" board to decide disputes
arising locally. An agreement creating a special board commonly specifies a docket of disputes to be decided and, unless the agreement is
amended, the special board ceases to exist when its docket of disputes
is exhausted. 3
Presumably the statutory authority for special boards is Railway
Labor Act Section 3 Second,34 which provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any individual carrier, system, or group of carriers and any class or
classes of its or their employees . . . from mutually agreeing

to the establishment of system, group, or regional boards of adjustment for the purpose of adjusting and deciding disputes of
the character specified in this section. In the event that either
party to such a system, group, or regional board of adjustment
is dissatisfied with such arrangement, it may upon ninety days'
notice to the other party elect to come under the jurisdiction of
the [National Railroad] Adjustment Board..
Insofar as the last sentence above means that a "system, group, or
regional" board should have a permanent existence until terminated, the
usual "special" board with a limited life-span is not, at least theoretically, based upon the statute but solely upon the power of the parties
to make agreements.3"
In airline minor disputes, which are not within the jurisdiction of
the NRAB, system, group, and regional boards are the principal agencies
of adjustment. The statute not only permits their establishment, but
also imposes a duty upon the parties to reach an agreement creating
33. Samples of agreements setting up special boards may be found in an appendix
to Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Transportationand Aeronautics of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 141-49
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings].
34. As amended, 48 Stat. 1193 (1934).
35. Adding to the confusion is the fact that agreements establishing "special"
boards usually refer to them by that name, rather than the name given in § 153 Second,
but declare that the board is established under the authority of that subsection. See the
sample agreements cited note 33 supra. Whether the origin of the board is statutory or
nonstatutory would probably be significant only where one party tried to terminate the
board upon ninety days' notice and the agreement provided otherwise. See Dwellingham
v. Thompson, 91 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Rolfes v. Dwellingham,
198 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1952).

ADJUSTING THE ADJUSTMENT BOARD
them." The airline boards are, surprisingly, usually referred to by their
statutory name.
For both railroad special boards and airline system boards the National Mediation Board, although not directed to do so by the statute,
appoints neutral referees to resolve deadlocks in the same manner that
3
they are appointed for the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Arbitration
The 1934 legislation which created the NRAB did not repeal the
The complex
provisions of the 1926 act with respect to arbitration.
and rigidly-prescribed arbitration procedure is employed mainly to resolve major disputes.3 9
II.

PUBLIC LAW

456 AND THE DUTY TO AGREE

Despite the variety of methods by which minor disputes can be adjusted, most of railroad grievance work has been done by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board. By 1966, when Congress looked into the
matter, the Board was inundated by a burdensome backlog of unadjusted
cases.4" The First Division was more than seven years behind in its
36. Railway Labor Act § 204, added by 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184
(1964). In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 689-90
(1963), the Court said:
In view of the clearly stated purposes of the Act and of its history, reflecting as it does a steady congressional intent to move toward a reliable and
effective system for the settlement of grievances, we believe Congress intended
no hiatus in the statutory scheme when it postponed the establishment of a National Air Transport Adjustment Board and instead provided for compulsory
system, group, or regional 'boards. Although the system boards were expected
to be temporary arrangements, we cannot believe that Congress intended an interim period of confusion and chaos or meant to leave the establishment of the
Boards to the whim of the parties. Indeed, it intended the statutory command
to be legally enforceable in the courts and the boards to be organized and operated consistent with the purposes of the Act.
37.

31 NMB ANN. REP. 46 (1965).

38. Railway Labor Act §§ 7-9, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 15759 (1964).
39. 31 NMB ANN. REP. 32 (1965).
40. The crowded state of the NRAB's dockets is shown in the following table
compiled from 31 NMB ANN. REP. 76-77 (1965).
Fiscal Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
First Divasio
823
687
809
738
564
New cases docketed
443
194
143
140
220
Cases decided
556
183
111
383
350
Cases withdrawn
2,928
3,238
3,793
4,062
4,056
Backlog at end of year
Second Division
New cases docketed
Cases decided

205
184

198
268

217
218

287
178

216
278
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In hearings before House and Senate subcommittees, the railroads
and the brotherhoods each presented voluminous documentation to show
that the other was to blame for the grievance logjam. The very contrariety of their respective assertions, however, exemplified the basic
cause of the crisis. None of the procedures that might have provided
an "escape valve" for the NRAB overflow could operate without some
kind of agreement, and management and union, even where the alternative was years of delay, were too frequently unable to agree.42 The members of the NRAB did not agree to the establishment of additional supplemental boards. Railroads and local unions did not agree to the establishment of special boards."
Neither party accepted previous NRAB
decisions as precedent, and issues which had been decided many times
were constantly recurring in cases submitted to the Board ;44 one witness
estimated that eighty-five percent of the First Division backlog consisted
of such cases.45 The carrier and union members of the Board were seldom able to agree upon an award,4 6 thus necessitating use of the timeCases withdrawn
Backlog at end of year

5
286

15
270

23
355

18
379

15
288

Third Division
New cases docketed
Cases decided
Cases withdrawn
Backlog at end of year

693
851
176
1,871

715
897
219
2,197

779
786
126
2,598

773
544
144
2,731

783
359
127
2,646

Fourth Division
New cases docketed
Cases decided
Cases withdrawn
Backlog at end of year

109
80
28
32

80
90
23
31

96
97
48
64

126
91
38
113

98
46
35
106

41. S. REP. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
42. See Lazar, Eunomics: A Behavioral-Science View of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board System, 1961 DUKE L.J. 262.
43. In the fiscal year 1965, special boards of adjustment disposed of 2565 disputes
which would otherwise have been submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board,
but this did not significantly reduce the NRAB backlog. 31 NMB ANN. REP. 45 (1965).
44. See Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 41, 76 (1962) ; Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,Part 4, Railway Labor, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 18-20 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Att'y Gen. Rep.].
45. s965 House Hearings 34.
46. The notorious inability of the members of the NRAB to come to agreement on
awards is reflected in the following table compiled from 31 NMB ANN. REP. 76-77
(1965).

First Division
Decided with referee
Decided without referee

1965

1964

79
141

103
37

Fiscal Year
1963
112
31

1962

1961

152
42

226
217
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117

consuming process of appointing a referee. Since referees are chosen
only after the Board has deadlocked, most cases were considered twice,
and the ad hoc nature of the referee's appointment aggravated the stare
decisis problem. Lack of rapport in these areas was the cause of the
NRAB backlog.
Obviously the problem would not have been alleviated by the creation of additional consensual alternatives to the NRAB. The railroads
proposed that the National Mediation Board, which is composed not of
partisans but of presidential appointees, be empowered to create supplemental adjustment boards whether or not the NRAB consented. 7 Congress, however, adopted the method proposed by the brotherhoods.48 UnSecond Division
Decided with referee
Decided without referee

182
2

267
1

213
5

165
13

270
8

Third Division
Decided with referee
Decided without referee

832
19

893
4

768
18

534
10

342
17

Fourth Division
Decided with referee
Decided without referee

79
1

83
7

91
6

73
8

33
13

Partisanship on the Board is so intense that if only one member wishes to vote in favor
of the side he represents, the other four members of his faction defer to his determination, and thus every vote is either 5-5 or 10-0 (except in the case of the Fourth Division,
which has only six members). 1965 House Hearings212. E. T. Horsley, a carrier member of the First Division, summarized the situation by telling Congress that "the 'advocate' character of all members is dearly distinguishable from any semblance of 'judgeship' in our roles." Id. at 171.
47. The carriers' proposals are set forth in Hearing on H.R. 706 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 130-31 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearing].
48. Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1525. The language quoted here is cited as "§ 1" not because it is so designated in the statute, but because it includes all the language preceding the part designated
as "§ 2." Section 1 adds the following language to Railway Labor Act § 3 Second, as
amended, 48 Stat. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1964) :
If written request is made upon any individual carrier by the representative
of any craft or class of employees of such carrier for the establishment of a
special board of adjustment to resolve disputes otherwise referable to the Adjustment Board, or any dispute which has been pending before the Adjustment
Board for twelve months from the date the dispute (claim) is received by the
Board, or if any carrier makes such a request upon any such representative,
the carrier or the representative upon whom such request is made shall join in an
agreement establishing such a -board within thirty days from the date such request is made. The cases which may be considered by such board shall be defined in the agreement establishing it. Such board shall consist of one person
designated by the carrier and one person designated by the representative of
the employees. If such carrier or such representative fails to agree upon the
establishment of such a board as provided herein, or to exercise its rights to
designate a member of the board, the carrier or representative making the request for the establishment of the special board may request the Mediation
Board to designate a member of the special board on behalf of the carrier or
representative upon whom such request was made. Upon receipt of a request
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der the new provision, minor disputes which have not been submitted to
the NRAB or which have been on the NRAB docket for more than
twelve months may be submitted locally to a new version of the "special"
board created by what might be characterized as a "unilateral agreement."
If the union wishes to set up a special board (the carrier may also
initiate a special board, but for illustrative purposes the union is presumed
to be the initiating party), it need only serve notice upon the railroad, and
the latter "shall join in an agreement" establishing such a board. If the
railroad "fails to agree," by failing to appoint a person to serve as its
member of the special board, the National Mediation Board must appoint "an individual associated in interest" with the railroad to deal with
the union in the railroad's behalf in working out the terms of the agreement. If these two fail to agree upon such matters as the particular
disputes to be decided, etc., and are also unable to agree upon a person to
break the deadlock, the NMB must make another appointment-a neutral
man in this instance-and the neutral man, in effect, draws up the "agreement" between the union and the carrier or the person associated in interest with the carrier. After the special board has been established, the
neutral man drops out of the picture, and the members of the special
for such designation the Mediation Board shall promptly make such designation
and shall select an individual associated in interest with the carrier or representative he is to represent, who, with the member appointed by the carrier or
representative requesting the establishment of the special board, shall constitute
the board. Each member of the board shall be compensated by the party he is
to represent. The members of the -board so designated shall determine all matters not previously agreed upon by the carrier and the representative of the
employees with respect to the establishment and jurisdiction of the board. If
they are unable to agree such matters shall be determined by a neutral member
of the board selected or appointed and compensated in the same manner as is
hereinafter provided with respect to situations where the members of the
board are unable to agree upon an award. Such neutral member shall cease
to be a member of the board when he has determined such matters. If with
respect to any dispute or group of disputes the members of the board designated
by the carrier and the representative are unable to agree upon an award disposing of the dispute or group of disputes they shall by mutual agreement select
a neutral person to be a member of the board for the consideration and disposition of such dispute or group of disputes. In the event the members of the
board designated by the parties are unable, within ten days after their failure to
agree upon an award, to agree upon the selection of such neutral person, either
member of the 'board may request the Mediation Board to appoint such neutral
person and upon receipt of such request the Mediation Board shall promptly
make such appointment. The neutral person so selected or appointed shall be
compensated and reimbursed for expenses by the Mediation Board. Any two
members of the board shall be competent to render an award. Such awards
shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute and if in favor of
the petitioner, shall direct the other party to comply therewith on or before the
day named. Compliance with such awards shall be enforcible by proceedings
in the United States District Courts in the same manner and subject to the same
provisions that apply to proceedings for enforcement of compliance with awards
of the Adjustment Board.
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board--i.e., the union representative on one side and the railroad's designee or the person associated in interest with the railroad on the other-at
last get down to the business of hearing the disputes specified in the
"agreement." If the special board so constituted is unable to agree upon
the disposition of a dispute, a second neutral man is appointed in the same
manner as the first. It is significant that the second neutral man is not
appointed ad hoc for each dispute, as are NRAB referees, but is appointed
to decide any "dispute or group of disputes." This language does not
require that all the deadlocked disputes before a particular special board
be resolved by the same person, but this has been the usual practice.49
The unique and critical part of this process is the formation of the
"agreement," particularly where a first neutral man is necessary. In
customary railway labor terminology, he must decide a "major dispute"
between the parties, since he is not interpreting an existing contract but
helping the parties to create a new one. Unfortunately, the statute does
not make dear whether the first neutral man is empowered to exclude
particular disputes from the jurisdiction of the special board. The statute provides that "the cases which may be considered by the special board
shall be defined in the agreement establishing it" and that the first neutral man "determines all matters not previously agreed upon .

.

.

with

respect to the establishment and jurisdiction of the board." From this
language it appears that if the union were to request the establishment of
a special board to decide a number of disputes, the neutral man might
compromise the contentions of the union and the carrier by creating a
special board to decide only some of them. This practice would produce
only delay-the problem sought to be eliminated by the statutory amendment-and would result in the proliferation of special boards, since nothing in the statute prevents the union from later requesting the establishment of a second special board to decide the disputes excluded from the
first special board. The statute should be construed to prevent the first
neutral man from excluding any disputes proposed by the party requesting the establishment of the special board. A possible exception to this
rule is pointed out in the legislative history:
The cases which may be considered by any special board will, of
course, be defined in the agreement establishing the board. Some
concern was expressed during the hearings by witnesses representing the carriers that the mechanism established by the bill
could be used by one union for the purpose of raiding the membership of another. The committee feels that there is no cause
49. See 31 NMB

ANN.

Rep. 65-67 (1965).
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for apprehension on this score, since all persons involved are
expected to use this legislation in good faith and in accordance
with its purpose and intent. This means that neither a union or
a carrier can properly demand the establishment of a special
board with jurisdiction so broad as to invade the jurisdiction
of another union as heretofore customarily respected in the
establishment of special boards by voluntary agreement; should
any party do so the party upon whom the demand is made would
be expected to refuse to agree to such jurisdiction. Such refusal would then force a jurisdictional determination by a neutral designated as provided in the bill. The neutral, in turn,
would be expected to determine the jurisdiction of the board so
as not to invade the established jurisdiction of another union."
Although the committee was quite properly concerned with the problem
of raiding membership, the authority of the first neutral man to exclude
requested disputes should be limited to these special situations. In ordinary grievances, where there is no question of the standing of the requesting union to represent the employees involved, the neutral man
should not seek compromise but should promote the expeditious adjustment of disputes by including all the disputes in the special board's
jurisdiction.
Some problems may also be encountered in the selection of the "individual associated in interest" to stand in the shoes of a party who
"fails to agree." The National Mediation Board has a long list of available arbitrators who are purportedly "neutral" men, but it may be difficult to find anyone who is clearly partisan and willing to serve in behalf
of the protesting party. Another problem might arise in the compensation of this person. He becomes a member of the special board and as
such is entitled to compensation from the party with whom he is associated in interest. The latter, of course, has already evidenced, by his
failure to name a member of the board, a strong desire to have nothing to
do with the board and might not be willing to pay the appointee associated
in interest very well, if at all., Since the statute does not give the National Mediation Board the authority to fix the salary to be paid to its
appointee by the person he is to represent, the board might never begin
to function for want of an individual to serve in this position. One way
to solve this would be for the person appointed to agree with the opposing
party to fix his own salary as part of the "agreement" setting up the special board, but this would be a high-handed maneuver to say the least,
50.

H.R. REP. No. 1114, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966).
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and would probably not be enforceable as between the party who has failed
to agree and the person representing him. Further, the statute does not
make clear whether the party who has failed to agree may at some later
time change his mind, unseat the person associated in interest with him,
and appoint his own nominee to the board. Fortunately, these difficulties should not often arise, since even the most obstinate party will usually
prefer to select his own board member rather than have the National
Mediation Board do it for him. Indeed, since the establishment of a
special board by one means or another is inevitable once one party has
demanded it, it would probably have been better for the statute to have
imposed a duty upon the non-requesting party to name a board member,
thus avoiding all the problems involved with respect to the "individual
associated in interest."
The most interesting feature of P.L. 456 is not, however, the intricacies of its unusual and untried procedures, but rather the uniqueness
of its overall approach. Certainly, no one could contend that under the
statute carriers and unions will be negotiating "agreements" to set up
special boards. Indeed, the amendments were found to be necessary to
cure the ills occasioned by the absence of agreement. What Congress
has really done is extend its policy of compulsory arbitration-long embodied only in the NRAB--down to the local level. Yet, although to
speak in terms of an "agreement" is unsound analytically, the psychology
of labor relations is often such that an occasional legal fiction is necessary to make it appear-at least superficially-that all is amity and accord; in the case of special boards under P.L. 456, Congress has concluded that an agreement by any other name would not smell as sweet.
Most importantly, the establishment of special boards in this manner is
well calculated to accomplish the statute's objective of reducing the
NRAB workload. Although the Board had not yet felt the effect of the
new legislation by the end of the summer, there is general agreement that
the present backlog will be significantly reduced within a short time.5
III.

PuiLic LAW

456

AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

The PriorLaw
In the thirty-two years between the creation of the NRAB and the
1966 legislation, the courts in dealing with the question of judicial review
of the merits52 of NRAB awards were faced with legislative provisions
51. Interview with Mr. Patrick V. Pope, Administrative Officer, National Railroad Adjustment Board, in Chicago, Ill., August 29, 1966.
52. Although this note is primarily concerned with review of the merits, it should
be noted that awards have often been set aside for failure of the parties or the NRAB
to follow the statutory procedures. A point of particular contention has been the ap-
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so vague and ambiguous that almost every decision violated at least some
part of the statutory language. Upon the assumption that a page of history is better than the complete absence of logic, it is necessary to review
the existing law in some detail in order to understand why Congress concluded that a change was necessary, and in order to determine whether
the means adopted will achieve the desired results.
Prior to 1966 the statute contained no procedures for direct review
of NRAB awards. The courts construed this omission as a prohibition,
and any proceeding instituted to review an award, to set it aside, to enjoin the carrier from putting it into effect, or to obtain a declaratory
judgment of its correctness, was dismissed." However, the question of
review was often raised collaterally in two types of suits brought by employees. The first type was an action brought upon the underlying controversy by an employee who had already been unsuccessful before the
Board, and the question with respect to "review" was whether the adverse NRAB award barred the action. The second type was an action
brought by an employee under subsection (p) of the act to enforce an
award in his favor, and the question was whether the court was permitted
by the language of subsection (p) to consider the merits of the underlying
claim before directing that the award be enforced.
Suits brought notwithstanding an adverse award: When it was
thought that jurisdiction over all minor disputes was vested concurrently
in the courts and the Board, 4 a suit by an employee whose claim had been
plication of Railway Labor Act § 3 First (j), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 153 First (j) (1964), which requires that the Board "shall give due notice of
all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any
disputes ....
." Frequently the NRAB renders an award in favor of a claimant union
without giving notice to the employees of another union who are affected by the award;
such awards are void. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F.2d
527 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) ; Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
171 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948); but cf. Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 866
(1955) (dictum). The Supreme Court has never considered these problems but will
probably do so this Term; see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Union Pac. R.R., 349 F.2d
408 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. granted sub nora. Transportation-Communication Workers
Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 383 U.S. 905 (1966). See Kroner, supra note 44, at 50-57.
53. "The only way an employee who loses before the Board can obtain a judicial
review would be upon an allegation that the action of the Board was either illegal or not
based on any evidence, and was consequently arbitrary and capricious-the same as a
judicial review of any other administrative body." Aiello v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R.,
35 CCH Lab. Cas. 97766, 97767 (N.D. Ill. 1958) ; accord, Edwards v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R.,
361 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Kemp v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 358 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1966); Parker v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 108 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Railroad Yardmasters v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 39 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ohio 1940). See also D'Elia
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 338 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978
(1965). Review of NRAB awards is not available under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964), because that act does
not apply to administrative agencies composed of representatives of the parties. Stranford v. Pennsylvania R.R., 155 F. Supp. 680 (D.N.J. 1957).
54. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
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denied by the Board could easily be dismissed by pointing out that the
employee in selecting the NRAB as his original forum was bound by his
"election of remedies." 5 However, as the Supreme Court expanded the
ambit of the Board's exclusive primary jurisdiction, " the election-ofremedies rationale was rendered inapplicable in many cases, and other
reasoning was employed to support the holding that the suit could not be
maintained. The biggest obstacle to the employee's action was the provision of subsection (m) 7 that "the awards shall be final and binding
upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a
money award."" In addition, the lower federal courts, despite a caveat
from the Supreme Court, " interpreted Slocum's rule of "exclusive juris55. "[TJhis procedure by both right and reason represents an election of remedies
which bars the suit which was otherwise available to the claimant." Michel v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 188 F.2d 224, 226-27 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951). Accord,
Morrissette v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 299 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
874 (1962); Griffith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 162 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Stranford v. Pennsylvania R.R., 155 F. Supp. 680 (D.N.J. 1957); Byers v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 129 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Greenwood v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 129
F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Kelly v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 75 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. Tenn. 1948); Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
56. See notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.
57. The text of this subsection, Railway Labor Act § 3 First (m), as amended, 48
Stat. 1191 (1934), was as follows prior to the 1966 amendment:
The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be
stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective
parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both
parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In
case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award the division of
the Board shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute.
The reason for the "money award" exception has been obscured by the passage of time.
When asked about the "final and binding" language, Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, the man
responsible for the drafting of the 1934 amendments, told Congress that it was taken
from the 1926 version of the act. Hearings on H.R. 765o Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934). Railway Labor
Act § 3 First (e), 44 Stat. 579 (1926), provided that any voluntary agreement establishing a local adjustment board "shall stipulate that decisions of adjustment boards shall be
final and binding upon both parties to the dispute; and it shall be the duty of both
parties to abide by such decisions." Mr. Eastman's statement consequently does not explain the money award exception. Perhaps the draftsmen thought it was necessary to
preserve the act's constitutionality in the face of contemporary Supreme Court decisions
which held that due process required judicial review in some situations. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) ; see Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson
Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. Rav. 163 (1949). It may also be speculated that the exception
was caused by an effort to accommodate subsection (m) with subsection (p). See
note 73 infra.
58. Finlin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 288 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1961); Rose v. Great No.
Ry., 268 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1959); Barnett v. Pennsylvania R.S. Lines, 245 F.2d 579
(3d Cir. 1957); Reynolds v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 174 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1949);
Sjaastad v. Great No. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 760 (D.N.D. 1958); Koelker v. Baltimore &
O.RIR., 140 F. Supp. 887 (RD. Pa. 1956) ; Parker v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 108 F. Supp.
186 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 75 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio
1948).
59. The Slocum majority had cautioned that the Court in that case was not "called
upon to decide any question concerning judicial proceedings to review board action or
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diction" to mean not only that an employee must resort first to the
NRAB, but also that the courts were without jurisdiction of minor disputes even after a decision by the Board."
Not until 1959 did the Supreme Court consider such a case. In
Union Pacific R.R. v. Price,1 a former railroad employee, having unsuccessfully sought reinstatement from the NRAB, brought a suit against
the railroad for wrongful discharge. The district court held that the adverse NRAB award barred the action and granted summary judgment in
favor of the railroad. Although impliedly conceding that the award
would not bar the action if it were not decided upon the merits, " the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan rested upon three grounds. First,
the award was not a "money award" and was therefore "final and binding" under subsection (m) : "Respondent does not argue that a 'money
award' is anything other than an award directing the payment of money.
Indeed, it would distort the English language to interpret that term as
including a refusal to award a money payment."6
Second, the Court
looked to the legislative history of 1934 and found certain passages upon
which it relied to support its decision.64 Third, since the case was adinaction." Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 n. 7 (1950). The dissent of Mr. Justice Reed had made the same point: "I have assumed that the Court
means only to impose a requirement of primary recourse to the Board. But that inevitably means that many litigants would be deprived of access to the courts.
Id. at 252.
60. E.g., Rose v. Great No. Ry., 268 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Stranford v. Pennsylvania R.R., 155 F. Supp. 680 (D.N.J. 1957).
61. 360 U.S. 601 (1959).
62. The Supreme Court disagreed with the finding of the court of appeals, which
had reversed the district court's judgment on the ground that the Board's denial of the
claim was based only upon the Board's finding that the carrier had properly observed
the procedures specified in the collective bargaining agreement, rather than upon the
merits of the issue of wrongful discharge. Price v. Union Pac. R.R., 255 F.2d 663 (9th
Cir. 1958).
63. Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 608 (1959). Accord, Futhey v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 96 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1951) ; Hecox v. Pullman Co., 85 F. Supp.
34 (W.D. Wash. 1949); Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissent, would have no part of this reasoning:
An award of no damages is, as I see it, as much a "money award" as an award
of 6 cents. The words "money award" are merely descriptive of the nature of
the claim, setting that class apart from other suits which involve, for example,
a declaration of seniority rights.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, supra at 618-19.
64. The Court relied on the statements of a union president who remarked that
"[W]e are willing to take our chances with this national board because we believe, out
of our experience, that the national board is the best and most efficient method of getting
a determination of these many controversies. . . " Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Commnittee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934).

But it appears

from the context of his remarks that he was merely speaking of the advantages of a
national board over a system of local boards. The Court also pointed to the testimony
of Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Hearings on H.R.

ADJUSTING THE ADJUSTMENT BOARD
mittedly one which could have been brought in court initially under the
Moore rule the Court employed the familiar "election of remedies" rationale,6" pointing out that the plaintiff had previously chosen the NRAB
as the forum to determine the wrongfulness of his discharge, and was
"seeking to relitigate in the courts the same issue.""6
The presence of the election-of-remedies reasoning in Priceleft open
the question whether the same result would be reached in the case of an
employee who had had no election of remedies because his claim fell
within the "exclusive jurisdiction" rule of Slocum. In PennsylvaniaR.R.
v. Day," a companion case to Price,the Court sidestepped the issue. Day
involved a claim for back wages brought by a retired employee-clearly
a claim which could not have been brought in court before submission to
the NRAB. The claim of the plaintiff in Day had not been so submitted,
but the Board had denied identical claims brought by other employees.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's case upon the theory that the
Board's interpretation of the contractual provision in question was "final
and binding" even upon the plaintiff, who had not been a party to any
proceedings before the Board.6" Viewed this way, the case stands for
the denial of judicial review even where the employee has made no election of remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint, but, because the individual claim of the plaintiff had not been
submitted to the NRAB, analyzed the case as involving only the question
of NRAB original jurisdiction and regarded as the most important issue
whether the fact of the plaintiff's retirement took the case outside the
Slocum rule. This view of the case enabled the Court to avoid the question whether the seventh amendment forbids the denial of both primary
7650 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1934), who emphasized that awards
are made final and binding by the terms of this act, and as I understand it,
the labor organizations, none of them, are objecting to that provision. They
have their day in court and they have their members on the adjustment board,
and if an agreement cannot be reached between the parties representing both
sides on the adjustment board, then a neutral man steps in and renders the decision, and they will be required to accept that decision when made, with respect
to these minor matters.
But here, too, the Court may have disregarded the context. The topic being discussed
was the possibility of strikes over minor disputes, and thus it is at least arguable that the
quoted passage means that a union must accept an award rather than go on strike, not
that the union must accept the award without appealing to the courts.
65. The Court phrased its holding in terms of the election of remedies: "We
therefore hold that the respondent's submission to the Board of his grievances as to the
validity of his discharge precludes him from seeking damages in the instant common-law
action." Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 617 (1959).

66. Id. at 609 n.8.
67.
68.

360 U.S. 548 (1959).
Day v. Pennsylvania R.R., 155 F. Supp. 695 (D.N.J. 1957).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

and appellate access to the courts in minor railway labor disputes.6" That
the Day case does not squarely hold that review may be denied in all such
disputes has not, however, discouraged the lower federal courts from relying on it for that proposition.7"
In brief, the law before the 1966 legislation was, with one exception
which is now insignificant,71 that an adverse NRAB award if properly
rendered and decided upon the merits precluded any judicial remedy for
the employee against the railroad.
Review in enforcement suts-the Dahlberg ride: Until late in 1965,
a quite different rule was applied when the railroad, rather than the employee, sought judicial review of an adverse award. When an employee
brings suit in a district court to enforce an award against a carrier who
refuses to comply with it voluntarily, he must proceed under subsection
3 First (p) 2 of the act. Before amendment in 1966, that subsection
contained language which apparently directed the courts to determine the
69. The constitutional issue is discussed in notes 144-48 infra and accompanying
text.
70. E.g., Finlin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 288 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1961).
71. In Cook v. Thompson, 150 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Tex. 1957), the carrier, who
had submitted the dispute to the NRAB, successfully moved for a stay of the employee's
wrongful discharge suit. The Board found for the carrier, and the court dismissed the
complaint upon the ground that the Board's award was final and binding upon the employee. Cook v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 161 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Tex. 1958). The court
of appeals reversed, holding that where the employee has a claim which may be brought
in court under Moore and has not himself submitted the dispute to the Board, the railroad may not prevent judicial consideration of the merits by obtaining an award from
the NRAB. Cook v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 263 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
866 (1959). The opposite result was reached in Sjaastad v. Great No. Ry., 158 F. Supp.
760 (D.N.D. 1958). See also Rose v. Great No. Ry., 268 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1959). If
it is true that the Supreme Court will soon overrule Moore, as speculated in note 29
supra, the issue presented in the Cook and Sjaastad cases will be rendered moot.
72. The text of Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), as amended, 48 Stat. 1192 (1934),
before amendment in 1966, was as follows:
If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment
Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for
whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court of the United
States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal
operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates, a petition
setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the
division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District
Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits,
except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of
the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,
and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court
nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue
upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the
expenses of the courts of the United States. If the petitioner shall finally prevail, he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected
as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the
rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such
judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce
or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.
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merits of the grievance upon which the award had been rendered before
enforcing the award. Under subsection (p) the employee seeking enforcement was required to plead not only the award, but also the underlying "causes for which he claims relief"; the case was to "proceed in all
respects as other civil suits"; there was to be a "trial" at which the
Board's findings were merely "prima fade evidence" of the facts; and
the court was empowered to "enforce or set aside the award." These
provisions, which made no distinction between money awards and nonmoney awards, were in sharp conflict with the provision of subsection
(m) that "the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute, except in so far as they shall contain a money award." Blame
for this conflict must be placed upon the draftsmen of the 1934 amendments, who pieced together the NRAB provisions with fragments of
other legislation. Subsection (p) appears to have been slavishly copied
from the Interstate Commerce Act without regard to how it might operate in its new context."
To the courts fell the task of resolving the conflict. Although a
true in pari inateria construction might have resulted in a rule that the
language of subsection (p) provided for review only when a money
73.

Compare the text of Railway Labor Act § 3 First (p), as amended, 48 Stat.

1192 (1934), set forth note 72 supra, with the following text of Interstate Commerce Act
§ 16(2), as amended, 36 Stat. 554 (1910), as it appeared in 1934 (italics added) :
If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the circuit court of the United States for
the circuit in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating
office of the carrier, or through which the road of the carrier runs, or in any
State court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a petition
setting forth the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the commission in the premises. Such suit in the circuit court of the United States shall
proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial
of such suit the findings and order of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be
liable for costs in the circuit court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the
proceedings unless they accrue upon his appeal. If the petitioner shall finally
prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected
as a part of the costs of the suit.
Although the 1934 draftsmen are to be commended for such niceties as striking "like"
in favor of "as," it is unfortunate that they did not perceive the difficulties in transplanting this language. The section quoted above applied only to money claims; non-money
claims were to be enforced under Interstate Commerce Act § 16(11), as amended, 36
Stat. 555 (1910). In 1934 the words italicized above were omitted from subsection (p)
in order to provide one method of enforcing both types of awards; yet the "money
award" exception was added to subsection (m) (see note 57 supra) in such a way that
it appears that whoever drafted subsection (m) was trying to harmonize it with a proposed version of subsection (p) containing the italicized language. At this late date,
protracted speculation as to what actually transpired is merely academic with respect to
the substantive effect of this carelessness, but there is a lesson to be learned here by one
who might be tempted to use short-cut drafting techniques.
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award was sought to be enforced,74 the district courts and courts of appeals unanimously held that the enforcement suit was a trial de novo"
not only of money awards" but of non-money awards as well." This
construction necessitated some interesting exercises in semantics by courts
who tried to explain how a non-money award could be both "final and
binding" and yet subject to de novo review. For example, in the leading
case, Dahlberg v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 8 which denied enforce74. This argument was put forth by Mr. Justice Goldberg in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N.R.R., 373 U.S. 33, 43 n.1 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
He reasoned that since subsection (o) (see note 15 supra) provided that money awards,
but not non-money awards, must have a time limit, then the opening language of subsection (p) (see note 72 supra), viz., "If a carrier does not comply with an order . . .
within the time limit in such order . . .," led to the conclusion that "subsection (p) is
confined in its application to money claims." The trouble with this reasoning is that the
opening clause conditions all of subsection (p), and the absurd result of such a minute
analysis of this loose language would have been not only that non-money awards would
not be subject to de novo review, but also that they would not be able to be enforced
at all.
75. In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex.
R.R., 248 F. Supp. 243, 245 (E.D. Mo. 1965), the court said that "the suit to enforce is
a trial de novo, which means a complete, new trial, with no limitation as to the evidence
which may be brought in by the defendant. . . . The suit to enforce is much more than
a mere review of the Board's award. It is a new hearing, a trial de novo." Theoretically, at least, enforcement suits were to be something less than de novo trials because
of the statutory provision that the NRAB award was "prima facie evidence." Various
degrees of persuasiveness were accorded to awards under this rule. See, e.g., Russ v.
Southern Ry., 334 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1964) (shifts burden of proof to defendant carrier), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965) ; Crist v. Public Belt R.R. Comm'n, 93 F. Supp.
103, 105 ("entitled to respect") ; Swift v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 84 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.
Iowa 1944) (comparable to expert testimony); Hanks v. Delaware & H.R.R., 63 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (N.D.N.Y. 1945) ("great weight"). An instruction to the jury which
praised the Board's expertise in the field of railway labor was held to have been properly
refused in Callan v. Great No. Ry., 299 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1961).
76. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 338 F.2d 407 (10th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965) ; Russ v. Southern Ry., supra note 75.
77. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 334 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 936 (1964) ; Jones v. Central of Ga. Ry., 331 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Callan v. Great No. Ry., 299 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Boos v. Railway Express
Agency, 253 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1958); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 253 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1958); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Railway
Express Agency, 238 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters v.
Pullman Co., 200 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1952); New Orleans Pub. Belt R.R. Comm'n v.
Ward, 195 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Kirby v. Pennsylvania R.R., 188 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.
1951); Thomas v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 185 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1950); Dahlberg
v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 138 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1943); Washington Terminal Co. v.
Boswell, 124 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dictum), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 319
U.S. 732 (1943) ; Cleapor v. Atlanta, B. & C.R.R., 123 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 248 F. Supp. 243
(E.D. Mo. 1965); Hanson v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 236 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.W. Va. 1964),
vacated, 384 U.S. 211 (1966); Crist v. Public Belt R.R. Comm'n, 93 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.
La. 1950) ; Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 83 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa. 1949) ; Crowley v. Delaware & H.R.R., 63 F. Supp. 164 (N.D.N.Y. 1945); Hanks v. Delaware &
H.R.R., 63 F. Supp. 161 (N.D.N.Y. 1945); Order of Sleeping Car Conductors v. Pullman Co., 47 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1942) ; Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry., 16 F. Supp.
610 (S.D. Iowa 1936).
78. 138 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1943).
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ment of an award granting the plaintiffs higher seniority but no money
damages, the court found "final and binding" to have a very elastic
meaning:
Obviously the expression "final and binding" has its limitations.
Even the appellants [the employees seeking enforcement] concede that the award is neither so final that it may not be set
aside by the Court if the Board acted beyond its statutory authority nor so binding that the carrier can be compelled to obey
it without the aid of the Court in enforcement proceedings. We
think that the general plan of the statute clearly discloses an intention to use the words in the sense that the award is the definitive act of a mediative agency, binding until and unless it is set
aside in the manner prescribed, and that it was intended that the
Court should exercise broader powers than merely directing coercive process to issue if satisfied that the proceeding was authorized by law.7"
Other courts found equally dubious reasoning to reach the same result."s
Employees and their unions had reason to be discontent with the
Dahlberg rule. Because enforcement suits are always brought by employees,"' the rule always operated in favor of the railroad, which could
refuse to comply with any award and dare the union to submit to the
perils and delays of a de novo trial.8 " On the other hand, any court action
by the employee upon an award against him was barred by the rule of
Price and Day. The brotherhoods were displeased with this state of af79. Id. at 122. Opinions such as this may have prompted Mr. Justice Frankfurter
to his well-known dictum: "One need not italicize 'final' to make final mean final."
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 136 (1946) (concurring opinion).
80. In Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 253 F.2d 753
(4th Cir. 1958), the court observed that Railway Labor Act § 8(l), 44 Stat 585 (1926),
provided that arbitration awards shall be "final and conclusive" and reasoned that the
fact that "an entirely different provision" was made in the case of the NRAB "shows
clearly that Congress did not intend Board orders to have the effect of arbitration
awards." Of course, the opposite result would violate subsection (p) just as the
Dahlberg rule conflicts with subsection (m) ; and the arguments advanced in favor of
Dahlberg in Jones v. Central of Ga. Ry., 331 F.2d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1964), are therefore
compelling:
If absolute finality was intended, it is difficult to understand how the courts
could proceed in all respects as in other civil suits. Finality does not comport
with the provision that the finding should be only prima facie evidence of the
facts stated. If such were the case, no "if" would be attached to the right of
the petitioner to finally prevail; and the court would not have the choice to
enforce or set aside the order of the Board.
81. See note 17 supra.
82. Note that Railway Labor Act § 3 First (r), as amended, 48 Stat. 1192 (1934),
as renumbered, Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(e) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1527 [formerly codified as 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) (1964)], provides a two year period of limitations for enforcement suits.
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fairs. One of the arguments made by the plaintiff in Price was that whatever might be the technical subtleties of the statutory language, the act
should be construed to make review equally available to both sides. The
Court rejected this argument, remarking that "the disparity in judicial
review of Adjustment Board orders, if it can be said to be unfair at all,
was explicitly created by Congress, and it is for Congress to say whether
it ought to be removed" ;"3 the three dissenting Justices 4 took issue with
this proposition.
Another development made the Dahlberg rule even more unpalatable
to the unions. Their reluctance to submit awards to delay and de novo
review had often led them to seek methods of enforcement outside the
procedures in subsection (p). 5 For some time it was thought that the
use of economic pressure was a proper nonstatutory method of enforcement."6 But recently, in Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen" it was held that a strike with this objective
will be enjoined. The court's theory was that since industrial peace and
83. Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1959).
84. Namely, Justices Douglas, Black, and Warren. Mr. Justice Douglas found the
disparity of review to be
an unjustifiable discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. It is not the usual practice in this country to permit one
party to a lawsuit two chances to prevail, while the other has only one, nor to
permit one party but not the other to get a jury determination of his case.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, supra note 83, at 621 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Black
also took issue with the "glaring inequality of treatment between workers and railroads,"
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 559 (1959) (dissenting opinion), and added:
It surely would not be easy to uphold the constitutionality of a procedure which
takes away from both parties their ancient common-law right to a trial by court
and jury. It should be impossible to uphold it when, as here, the procedure
grants both parties an administrative hearing and then gives one of them a
second chance before a judge and jury while denying it to the other.
Id. at 561.
85. A unique and effective non-statutory means of enforcement was found by the
disappointed employees in In re Chicago Great Western R.R., 17 F. Supp. 932 (N.D.
Ill. 1937). The court had advised trustees in bankruptcy for the railroad not to pay a
group of NRAB awards until they had been enforced according to the provisions of subsection (p). The final outcome was related on the floor of the Senate:
Mr. President, on Thursday of last week the senior Senator from Idaho introduced a resolution directing the Committee of Interstate Commerce to inquire into the refusal of the trustees of the Chicago Great Western Railroad to
pay certain awards made by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. .

.

.

I

am glad to report that since the Senator from Idaho introduced his resolution,
the trustees . . . have agreed to pay the awards in full, thus ending the unfortunate controversy ...

[T]he unions very properly, in my judgment, refused to become parties to
long and expensive litigation. ...
In my judgment, they paid it only because of the fact that an investigation
of the whole matter would be taken up by the committee on Interstate Commerce.
81 CONG. REc. 2959 (1937) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
86. See, e.g., 1941 Att'y Gen. Rep. 6.
87. 290 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 966 (1961).
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the uninterrupted flow of commerce are the ends sought to be achieved
by the Railway Labor Act, the provision in subsection (p) for judicial
enforcement of awards impliedly precludes economic self-help as a method
of obtaining compliance. The decision is also based on the general rule
that strikes over minor disputes are improper at any stage of the adjustment process.88 The true significance of Denver, however, was that in
holding that all awards must be enforced under subsection (p), it guaranteed the carrier's right to judicial review of any award which it wished
to contest.
The Gunther case: The Dahlberg rule never had the imprimatur of
the Supreme Court. The Court had acknowledged in Price that a "disparity in judicial review" existed,89 but a later dictum had questioned the
rule."0 Finally, in late 1965 the Court abruptly overturned the Dchlberg
rule in Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry.9" Gunther, a 71year-old locomotive engineer, was discharged by the railroad because of
his failing health. The NRAB determined that the collective bargaining
agreement did not permit the carrier to be the sole judge of Gunther's
fitness for his job, and ordered the appointment of a panel of physicians
to examine him. In accordance with their findings, the Board rendered
an award ordering that Gunther be reinstated and paid for the time he
had lost. The carrier refused to comply with the award, and Gunther
brought an enforcement suit under subsection (p). The district court
denied enforcement on the grounds that (1) the collective bargaining
agreement did not limit the railroad's common-law discretion to discharge
employees for medical reasons and (2) the NRAB lacked authority to
88. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363
U.S. 528 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353
U.S. 30 (1957); New York Cent R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 355
F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1966); Brotherhood of R.R. Carmen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 354
F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1965); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 296 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Texas Pac.-Mo. Pac. Terminal R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 232 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. La. 1964) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Transport
Workers, 178 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1957). See also Comment, Enjoining Strikes and
Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 CoLum. L. REV. 381 (1960).
89. See note 83 szpra.
90. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N.R.R., 373 U.S. 33,
40-41 (1963), the Court, in holding that a strike called by a union in support of its interpretation of the amount of money due under an ambiguous award in the union's favor
was properly enjoined, observed that "we do not deal here with nonmoney awards,
which are made 'final and binding' by § 3 First (m). . . . This, then, is clearly a controversy concerning a 'money award' as to which decisions of the Adjustment Board are
not final and binding." The dictum had no effect on the courts of appeals, who adhered
to the Dahlberg rule to the bitter end. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 334 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.) ("certainly not a clear mandate for change"),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 934 (1964).
91. 382 U.S. 257 (1965).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
impanel a board of physicians. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting
both these contentions and going further. In a unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Black the Court held that since the NRAB's decision
was not "wholly baseless and completely without reason,"92 the district
court could not substitute its judgment for that of the Board on the question whether the railroad had an absolute right under the collective bargaining agreement to discharge an employee for failing health:
The basic grievance here-that is, the complaint that petitioner
has been wrongfully removed from active service as an engineer
because of his health-has been finally, completely, and irrevocably settled by the Adjustment Board's decision. Consequently,
the merits of the wrongful removal issue as decided by the Adjustment Board must be accepted by the District Court."
Although Gunther eliminated judicial review of the merits of all awards,
the Court apparently felt that some effect must be given to the exception
for money awards. Consequently, it assumed without discussion that the
money award exception was intended to make reviewable the amount of
money awarded, rather than the merits of an award directing the payment
of money. The Court remanded Gunther's suit to the district court with
instructions to enforce that part of the award reinstating Gunther (by
then 82 years of age) as a locomotive engineer and to hold a trial de novo
on the issue of damages.
There are many defects in the Gunther opinion. First, the Court did
not appear to understand the Dahlberg rule when it stated that the district
court had reviewed the merits "merely because one part of the Board's
order contained a money award" ;94 the district court, following Dahlberg,
would have held a trial de novo whether or not a money award had been
made. Second, the Court did not discuss Dahlberg and the many cases
which followed it,9" or even accord them the dignity of a casual citation;
thirty years of existing law was completely ignored. Third, the Court
abruptly overturned the existing law even though legislation to amend
the law was pending in Congress. Fourth, the Court did not consider the
language of subsection (p), the basis of the Dahlberg rule. This last
omission is particularly regrettable since shortly after Gunther, the Court
had occasion to consider the nearly identical language of Section 16(2)
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 263.
Cases cited note 77 supra.
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of the Interstate Commerce Act," the ancestor of subsection (p)," and
found that ICC orders sought to be enforced under section 16(2) were
"fully reviewable.""
The lower courts had little experience in applying the Gunther case
before the enactment of P.L. 456. Although the Court in Gunther apparently intended to leave a "loophole" for review of awards which are
"wholly baseless and completely without reason," 99 recent cases indicate
that this standard dictates enforcement of awards even where the court
disapproves of them in the strongest terms.'
On the other hand, the
courts' power to review the amount of a money award includes the power
to reduce it to nominal damages,' which provides an opportunity to
96. 36 Stat. 554 (1910), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964). The current version is as set forth in note 73 supra, except that "district" has been substituted for "Circuit," "complaint" for "petition," and "plaintiff" for "petitioner."
97. See note 73 supra.
98. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 U.S. 576, 594
(1966). The Court had similarly construed § 16(2) in previous cases. United States v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 435 (1949) (affords "complete judicial review of adverse reparation orders") ; Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S.
412 (1915).
99. Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965).
100. In Edwards v. St Louis-S.F.R.R., 361 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1966), the NRAB
found that a carrier had not violated a provision of the collective bargaining agreement
which stated that an employee sought to be discharged "shall be permitted to examine
all witnesses and papers pertaining to the case" when it refused to permit the employee
to confront his accuser, a passenger who had claimed that he had not given her a receipt
for a five dollar fare. The NRAB held that the provision applied only to witnesses who
were employed by or subject to the control of the carrier. The court made the following remarks about the merits of the award:
What is particularly offensive is that the carrier not only elected to accept the
charge of its hitherto unknown customer and reject the denial of its longstanding employee, but that it imposed the harshest of all available sanctions
under circumstances which made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
the accused to test the credibility of his accuser. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
a situation in which a carrier could act with greater distrust of a veteran employee or greater disdain for the conventional notions of fair play and still
meet its obligations under grievance procedures prescribed by a collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 952. Nevertheless, the court held the award unreviewable because it was not, as
required by Gunther, "wholly baseless and completely without reason." Swygert, 3., dissented, saying that the courts could set aside an award found to be, as he found this one
to be, "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable." Id. at 958. In interesting contrast is
Barrett v. Manufacturers Ry., 254 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D. Mo. 1966), which takes a
skeptical view of Gunther and says that an award may be set aside if not "reasonably supported by the evidence and . . . grounded upon a correct interpretation of the law."
The award was enforced. See also Kemp v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 368 F.2d 722 (5th
Cir. 1966).
101. In Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen v. Southern Ry., 254 F. Supp. 564
(M.D.N.C. 1966), the carrier had employed outsiders to do signal installation work.
The Signalmen sued to enforce an NRAB award of fourteen dollars in favor of two
employees who, according to the contract, were among those employees having the exclusive right to perform the work. The court reduced the damages to one dollar (plus
a twenty-five dollar attorney's fee) upon the ground that the two employees, who had
worked a full day on the day in question, had suffered no monetary loss. Accord,
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evade the Gunther rule of unreviewability. Yet a recent case' 1 2 reversed
the determination of a district court that a money award for lost time
should be reduced by the employee's earnings in other jobs while wrongfully held out of service by the railroad. In holding, without explanation,
that the amount of a money award may be changed only if "wholly baseless and completely without reason," this case appears to have misapplied
the Gunther rule.
Review of system and special boards: The awards of system boards
and special boards are generally unreviewable. Agreements establishing
such boards usually provide that their awards are "final and binding"
(without the money award exception),10' and the authority for enforcement is the general jurisdictional statutes0 . rather than subsection (p)
The courts are more willing to interwith its troublesome language.'
where the language is
mean
"unreviewable"
and
binding"
to
pret "final
that of the parties instead of the statute,' even though the Supreme
Court has said that, at least in the case of airline system boards, the
statute imposes a duty upon the parties to include such language in the
system board agreement.0 7
The 1966 Amendment: CongressionalApproval of JudicialLegislation
The new statutory provisions on NRAB review were introduced into Congress before the Gunther decision but enacted after it. In the hearings in the House before Gunther, even the carriers conceded that de novo
review was unnecessary and that limited review should be equally available,' and the unions insisted upon complete unreviewability for both
sides. ' The decision in Gunther supported the unions' contention, and
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 338 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1964)
(pre-Guwther), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965). Another post-Gimther case reducing
the amount of a money award without disapproving of the merits is Barrett v. Manufacturers Ry., 254 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
102. Taylor v. Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., 362 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1966).
103. See 1966 Senate Hearing 64-65; 1965 Honse Hearings 141-49.
104. Either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964) (federal question and $10,000) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1964) (federal statute regulating commerce).
105. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
106. E.g., Arnold v. United Air Lines, 296 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1961); Woolley v.
Eastern Air Lines, 250 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Majors v. Thompson, 235 F.2d 449 (5th
Cir. 1956).
107. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 694
(1963) (dictum) (emphasis in original):
There may be, for example, any number of provisions with regard to the finality of an award that would satisfy the requirements of [Railway Labor Act
§ 204, added by 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964)] but we are
quite sure that some such provision is requisite to a § 204 contract and that the
federal law would look with favor upon contractual provisions affording some
degree of finality to system board awards .
108. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings 249.
109. Id. at 261.
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they relied upon it in the later Senate hearing.
What finally emerged from this debate is a statute which provides
for the first time a procedure for judicial review and which-paradoxically-limits review to cases in which either party wishes to have an
award set aside "for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of this Act [i.e., the entire Railway Labor Act], for failure of the
order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making
the order." '
It does not appear that the statute makes any significant changes in
the law as it stood after the Gunther decision. Of the grounds for review
specified in the statute, the first clause, requiring compliance with the
act, will permit the courts to continue to enforce such requirements as
notice to third parties."1 1 The second clause, containing the phrase "the
division's jurisdiction" may mean the "jurisdiction" of one division as
opposed to that of another; or the phrase may refer to the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the NRAB as a whole, which is defined as "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agree-ments concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 1" The latter construction is preferable in that it would permit the courts to review
matters not required to be submitted to the NRAB (such as the statutory
rights of a returning serviceman)". but which have been determined by
the Board as issues in a dispute otherwise within its jurisdiction. Review should be available in such a case, particularly if the party seeking
review is not the party who elected to submit the dispute to the Board.
The statute provides that there shall be no other grounds for review,
and thus by its express terms cuts off all review of the merits. In this
respect it appears on its face to go beyond the dictum in Gunther that the
courts might set aside an award that is "wholly baseless and completely
without reason." Congress, however, was as unwilling as the Supreme
Court to assume that there could never be a situation in which review
would be appropriate. The Senate Labor Subcommittee said in its report:
The committee gave consideration to a proposal that the
bill be amended to include as a ground for setting aside an
award "arbitrariness or capriciousness" on the part of the
110. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (q), added by Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2(e) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1527. See full text in note
117 infra.

111. See note 52 supra.
112. Railway Labor Act § 3 First (i), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First (i) (1964).
113. See note 25 supra.
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Board. The committee declined to adopt such an amendment
out of concern that such a provision might be regarded as an
invitation to the courts to treat any award with which the court
disagreed as being arbitrary or capricious. This was done on
the assumption that a Federal court would have the power to
decline to enforce an award which was actually and indisputedly
[sic] without foundation in reason or fact, and the committee
intends that, under this bill, the courts will have that power.'14
This passage is itself an "invitation to the courts" to review awards, although the language of the statute is-at long last-clear and unambiguous. Without belaboring the distinction between "wholly baseless and
completely without reason" and "actually and indisputedly without foundation in reason or fact,""' it may be said that the review provisions of
P.L. 456 do no more than (1) restate the law developed by the courts
from 1934 to 1965 and (2) bring "money awards" within the same rules.
Although the statute at last spells out the substantive grounds for
review, its technical difficulties have not been entirely eliminated. The
"disparity of review" arose not because Congress so intended in 1934,
but because the technicalities of the statutory language permitted the
question of review to be raised only collaterally, and in two very different
types of cases," 6 rather than directly. Mindful of this mistake, the draftsmen in 1966 have provided that either party may file a petition for review
in a district court." 7 However, even under the new language of subS. REP. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
As to whether either of these is a practical standard, see note 100 supra.
See text following note 53 supra.
Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(e) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CoDE:
CONG. & AD.NEws 1527, adds a new section to the act:
(q) If any employee or group of employees, or any carrier, is aggrieved by
the failure of any division of the Adjustment Board to make an award in a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of the terms of the award or by the
failure of the division to include certain terms in such award, then such employee or group of employees or carrier may file in any United States district
court in which a petition under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition for review of the division's order. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Adjustment Board. The Adjustment
Board shall file in the court the record of the proceedings on which it based
its action. The court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the division or to set it aside, in whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding
to the division for such further action as it may direct. On such review, the
findings and order of the division shall be conclusive on the parties, except
that the order of the division may be set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded to the division, for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of this Act, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to
matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making the order. The judgment of the court
shall be subject to review as provided in sections 1291 and 1254 of title 28,
United States Code.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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section (p),"'8 review is still available to the carrier in an employee's enforcement suit. Consequently, even though the grounds for review are the
same in both proceedings, some procedural difficulties may develop. If an
award is rendered in favor of an employee and the carrier refuses to
comply, the employee must seek to enforce it under subsction (p) as before. The railroad, if it feels that the award should not be enforced because it is reviewable under the new grounds for review, can seek to
have the award set aside in the enforcement proceedings, but it may prefer
to litigate the matter by bringing its own petition for review and avoid
the possibility of paying the employee's attorney's fees under subsection
(p). Consequently, a troublesome situation may arise when the railroad
files a petition for review and the employee simultaneously files an enforcement suit in the same court or in a different court. 19 The new
law's substantive restrictions on review will minimize the number of
awards as to which district judges can differ in their views on reviewability. Nevertheless, this opportunity for forum-shopping should have
been eliminated by making the petition for review the only way to obtain
review on any grounds, with enforcement available as a matter of right
if the carrier's petition for review has not been sustained or if the carrier
has not filed a petition for review within a certain time.
Another problem of construction arises where the Board has denied
an employee's claim. In filing a petition for review, the employee wants
more than a mere "setting aside" of the award; he wants the relief sought
unsuccessfully before the Board. Although the court has "jurisdiction"
to "remand the proceeding to the Board," it does not appear on the face
118. Subsection (m), set forth in note 57 supra, is amended by striking out
the phrase "except insofar as they shall contain a money award." Subsection (p),
set forth in note 71 supra, is amended by substituting "shall be conclusive upon the
parties" for "shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated" and by adding
the following language at the end:
Provided, however, That such order may not be set aside except for failure of
the division to comply with the requirements of this Act, for failure of the
order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making the order.
Pub. L. No. 456, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(a), (c), (d) (June 20, 1966), U.S. CODE
CoNG. & An. Naws 1526.
119. Subsection (q) provides that the petition for review may be filed "in any
United States district court in which a petition under paragraph (p) could be filed."
Subsection (p), set forth in note 72 supra, provides for employees' enforcement proceedings in "the district in which he [the employee] resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates." Only the
employee could bring an action under subsection (p) and the broad venue provision was
for his benefit. On the other hand, either party may file a petition for review under
subsection (q), and the incorporation by reference of subsection (p)'s venue provisions
may produce unwanted results in that the language clearly requires an individual employee or his union to contest petitions for review in any district in which the railroad
operates.
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of the statute that the court may make any final disposition of the matter.
Since one of the main purposes of the statute is to prevent unnecessary
delay in deciding minor disputes, a district court which has had all the
facts before it in a review proceeding should be empowered to make a
final disposition of the controversy.
The Rationale of Unreviewability
Of the few administrative agencies whose decisions are unreviewable, most deal with relations between the government and citizens. Of
the agencies concerned with controversies between private parties, only in
the case of the NRAB have the courts and Congress made review of the
merits completely unavailable.'
The most striking feature of the law of NRAB reviewability is the
absence from the court decisions of the traditional distinction between
"questions of law" and "questions of fact." 12' The great majority122 of
NRAB awards turn on the construction of a contract, which is commonly
regarded as a question of law 1 22 and as such subject to close judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to set aside contractual interpretations by other administrative agencies.'
Two factors account
for the courts' failure to apply the law-fact distinction in NRAB judicial
review cases. First, to apply it would frustrate the primary congressional purpose 25 in creating the NRAB, which was to provide an agency
120. The following discussion assumes that the question of judicial review is a
neutral one, i.e., that if review is equally available to carrier and union the advantages of
any particular rule of judicial review accrue equally to both sides. However, it is clear
from the legislative history of P.L. 456 that the unions opposed judicial review for
either side and that the carriers, although conceding the inequities of the "disparity of
review," were in favor of eliminating it by extending the right of de novo review to the
employee. See, e.g., 1966 Senate Hearing 25-29, 124-32; 1965 House Hearings 248-61.
Insofar as this implies that the Board is more favorable to labor than the courts, P.L.
456 did not result from a congressional determination of some fine points of administrative law but from a political choice.
121. See generally 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.02 (1958).
122. One estimate is ninety-five per cent. 1941 Att'y Gen. Rep. 13.
123. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 554 (1960) to the effect that the construction of a
contract, although analytically a "question of fact" in that it involves determining the
intent of the parties, is ordinarily regarded as a "question of law" because it is determined by the court rather than 'by the jury.
124. See, e.g., Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960)
(Federal Power Commission).
125. Professor Jaffe takes the position that the question of judicial review is essentially one of purpose, i.e., whether, in the light of the objectives sought to be realized
in a particular administrative scheme, Congress would have intended the question sought
to be reviewed to be committed to a court or administrator. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 569-75 (1965) ; Jaffe, JudicialReview: Question of Law, 69
HARv. L. REv. 239, 261 (1955). For a reply, see 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.07
(1958). Applied to the NRAB situation, the Jaffe approach would call for the denial
of review in all situations involving contract interpretation unless there is present some
extraneous issue not within the objectives sought to be achieved by congressional creation of the Board.
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to decide "disputes growing out of .

.

. the interpretation or application

of agreements."' 8 Second, it has been stated that the basis of the lawfact distinction is the comparative competence of courts in deciding questions of law and of agencies in deciding questions of fact;127 if it is true
that "insofar as the questions of law involve interpretation of the parties'
contracts, the Board is probably a good deal more competent to decide the
questions well,"' 2 s the reason for the distinction disappears. The courts
have been receptive to the second argument and have deferred to the
Board's expertise to such an extent that the law-fact dichotomy has been
forsaken and the concept of administrative expertness has become the
cornerstone of the rule of complete NRAB unreviewability. The Supreme Court has been particularly liberal in its estimate of the Board's
expertise: because "provisions in collective bargaining agreements are of
a specialized, technical nature calling for specialized, technical knowledge
in ascertaining their meaning and application,"' 29 the Court has chosen to
leave undisturbed the decisions of a tribunal which is "peculiarly familiar
with the thorny problems and the whole range of grievances that constantly exist in the railroad world"' 30 and whose members are "in daily
contact with workers and employers"'3 0 and know "the industry's language, customs, and practices."'

32

The fault with the administrative expertise rationale is that the conflicts inherent in the Board's bipartisan composition often prevent expertise from coming to the fore. The Board often decides cases by compromise rather than upon the merits, and the rights of the parties in a
case may be sacrified as the opposing factions on the Board try to maintain a balance between awards favoring carriers and those favoring
unions. 33 The frequency of deadlocks 34 and the lack of uniformity and
stare decisis3 3 in NRAB decisions evidence this. Unfortunately the ex126. Railvay Labor Act § 2, as amended, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a
(1964).
127. See LANDIs, THE AMI=NISTRATIW PRocEss 123-55 (1938). Professor Davis
asserts that the law-fact distinction has become merely a means of stating results already
reached by analysis of the relative expertness of the court or the agency to decide a particular question. "The Supreme Court commonly holds that because of such practical
considerations as the expertness of an agency or its staff, a question of what decision
to make on undisputed or established facts is a question of fact and not a question of
law." 4 DAvis, ADmINIsTRATIVE LAW § 30.03 (1958) (emphasis in original).
128. 1941 Att'y Gen. Rep. 6 n.12.
129. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 553 (1959).
130. Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965).
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. See generally Lazar, Eilwmics: A Behavioral-Science View of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board System, 1961 DunE L.J. 262.
134. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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pertise on the Board is more often the expertise of the politician or the
advocate than that of the impartial administrator.
A better justification of NRAB unreviewability can be found outside the Railway Labor Act. To an ever-increasing extent, disputes of
the type with which the NRAB is concerned are being settled in other
industries by private arbitration.136 The Steelworkers Trilogy.. has made
it clear that national labor policy favors arbitration, and that judicial review of an arbitrator's award is severely limited. It was strongly urged
upon Congress.. 8 that the same rule should obtain in the case of the
NRAB.
In many respects the analogy is compelling. The similarity between
the types of cases decided by the NRAB in the railroad industry and by
private arbitrators elsewhere is so marked that it has often been urged
that the NRAB be abolished and that private arbitration take its place.' 39
The same advantages are gained from the denial of NRAB review as are
gained from the denial of review of arbitration: elimination of delay,
relief of the burden upon the courts, low cost, and the psychological benefits of allowing labor and management to settle their own troubles' 4° -at
136. See generally Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1965) ; Fleming, The Labor
Arbitration Process: 1941-1963, 52 Ky. L.J. 817 (1964) ; Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 VAND. L. REv. 657 (1957) ; Taylor, The Voluntary
Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 49 MICH. L. REv. 787 (1951).
137. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
138. Among the many union spokesmen who made this point was a representative of
the Railway Labor Executives Association who remarked:
[T]he limited judicial function provided for in the bill is in accordance with
that generally prevailing with respect to arbitration awards, and that is what
the Railroad Adjustment Board is: it is in [sic] arbitration board.
1966 Senate Hearing 25.
139. [Tlhere seems little reason for the public to subsidize grievance arbitration on the railroads. It may be noted that the airlines, whose operations fall
generally within the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, have been encouraged under the Act to develop their own grievance machinery and have done
so. There is no good reason why the railroads and their unions should not also
be required to set up machinery of their own making. If experience in other
industries is any guide, this would lead to a swifter and more responsive grievance procedure. It would thereby serve the public interest and place the burden
for their own affairs on the parties.
LABoR STUDY GROUP, Co.imiTTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 105 (1961).
See also Kroner, Minor Disputes Under the Rail-

way Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 41, 78 (1962).
140. But see the remarks of Mr. Justice Reed in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.,
339 U.S. 239, 253 (1950) (dissenting opinion) :
Our duty as a court does not extend to a determination of the wisdom of
putting a solution of industry problems into the hands of industry agencies so
far as the Constitution will permit. Some may deem it desirable to weld
various industries or professions into self-governing forms completely free
from judicial intervention. This desire may spring from a conviction that
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least in cases of the interpretation of existing agreements where there are
involved no questions of national labor policy 4 ---without interference
from the courts. Nevertheless, it is ill-considered to assert, as did the
House Commerce Committee, that "since the NRAB is an arbitration
tribunal, in the committee's opinion all of the awards rendered by the
Board should be complied with."' 42 The analytical foundation of the unreviewability of arbitration has been that the parties have agreed to be
bound by the award and that the arbitrator "is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are obliged
to accept."'4
The NRAB, however, is such a tribunal; its function is
not the type of arbitration involved in the Steelworkers Trilogy but compulsory arbitration. This point was made before Congress by the carriers,' but without success.
Since Congress has expressed its clear intent to remove all minor disexperience and training in highly specialized fields give the members of a
group that understanding and capacity which will enable them to govern their
internal affairs better than would courts dealing with the generality of human
relations and only occasionally with these specialized controversies. . . . [But]
there is too much interrelation and interdependence between such groups and
the rest of the population.
141. But even in minor disputes there may be issues of public policy. "The nature
of the Adjustment Board system has continued to advance the cause of craft unions and
to penalize the railroads so that action on improved technology has had to be deferred."
Shils, Industrial Unrest in the Nation's Rail Industry, 15 LAB. LJ. 81, 97 (1964).
142. H.R. REP. No. 1114, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966). "[B]ecause the National
Railroad Adjustment Board has been characterized as an arbitration tribunal by the
courts, the grounds for review should be limited to those grounds commonly provided
for review of arbitration awards." S. REP. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
The judicial characterization referred to is the Supreme Court's statement that "there
was general understanding between both the supporters and the opponents of the 1934
amendment that the provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered
as compulsory arbitration in this limited field. Our reading of the Act is therefore
confirmed, not rebutted, by the legislative history." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957). When the 89th Congress must rely
on the 1957 Supreme Court's interpretation of what the 73d Congress had in mind concerning the NRAB, the ascendancy of circular reasoning is at hand. The Court's remark has often been misapplied. Seen in the context of the Chicago River holding, it
means that "arbitration" by the NRAB is "compulsory" in the sense that a strike is not
a permissible alternative to the adjustment system. Some, however, have found support
for unreviewability in the magic phrase "compulsory arbitration." See, e.g., the remarks
of the President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen at 1965 House Hearings261:
"The carriers' proposal to make all awards of the Adjustment Board subject to a complete judicial review de novo on the merits is the complete opposite of a system of final
and binding compulsory arbitration." That arbitration is compulsory is, however, an
argument in favor of judicial review, rather than against it; this point is made in the
text at notes 143-44 infra.
143. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAv. L. Rxv.
999, 1016 (1955), quoted with approval in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
144. "The governmental character of the Adjustment Board requires that its
awards be subjected to different, more demanding standards of judicial review than
those of arbitrating bodies that act under private agreements." x966 Senate Hearing 125
(memorandum submitted by National Railway Labor Conference).
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putes from the courts even in the absence of prior agreement of the parties, the question arises whether the seventh amendment forbids such
action. Priceand Day are commonly cited 4 ' as authority that it does not,
and although the majority in those cases did not discuss the issue,'46 the
general tenor of the opinions indicates that any seventh amendment objections to the NRAB system have been rejected. Even more significant
is the Gunther opinion, in which the three Justices who dissented in Price
and Day on seventh amendment grounds-Warren, Black, and Douglasjoined the unanimous Court, with Justice Black writing the opinion.
It appears clear that the Court, if faced with the necessity of specifically deciding the seventh amendment issue, would find the NRAB
review provisions constitutional. The seventh amendment guarantees
trial by jury only so far as that right "existed under the English common
law when the amendment was adopted."' 4 7 Although the common law
recognized various suits upon a contract of employment,'4 8 the types of
cases decided by the Board are not within the constitutional definition of
"suits at common law." Unions, collective bargaining, seniority, jurisdictional disputes, strikes, and indeed, even railroads, were unknown in
1791. The difference between railway labor minor disputes and the cases
contemplated by the seventh amendment is one of kind rather than of degree. The Supreme Court has found modern labor controversies so different from ordinary litigation as to be exempt from the common-law
aversion to private arbitration ;14 it would not be too great an extension
to recognize that such controversies were completely unknown to the
jurisprudence of the eighteenth century.
145. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1114, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966).
146. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
147. Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
148. See Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 303, 308 n.33 (1951).
149. A collective bargaining agreement "calls into being a new common law-the
common law of a particular industry or a particular plant." United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).

